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Abstract. DVB-RCS synchronization scheme on the Return 
Channel requires the RCSTs to be programmed with their 
location coordinates with an accuracy of no more than 
a few kilometers. RCSTs use this location information in 
their ranging calculation to the servicing satellite. For 
certain users this location information disclosure to the 
network operator can be seen as a serious security event. 
Recent work of the authors overcame this requirement by 
cloaking the location of an RCST in such a way (based on 
"spatial/geometric" symmetries of the network) that the 
respective ranging calculations are not affected. In this 
work we argue that timing tolerances in the Return 
Channel synchronization scheme, accepted by the DVB-
RCS standard, can be used in combination to the "spatial" 
method, further enhancing the location privacy of an 
RCST. Theoretical findings of the proposed "spatial-
timing" approach were used to develop a practical method 
that can be used by workers in the field. Finally this prac-
tical method was successfully tested on a real DVB-RCS 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
Security has always been a key issue in satellite com-
munication systems. Inspection of related bibliography [4], 
[8] reveals that security in DVB-RCS networks focuses on 
traditional areas such as confidentiality and integrity of 
data as well as source authentication. There is also an ef-
fort, due to the particular nature of satellite communi-
cations, to secure the physical layer against jamming, 
detection/interception, traffic analysis, Denial of Service 
and replay attacks [4]. Although location privacy has raised 
a number of concerns with the wide adoption of GPS / 
Internet enabled mobile devices [3] it has received little 
attention in the field of DVB-RCS security and relied only 
on scrambling the forward and return link to prevent 
unwanted leakage of information [8]. 
Location based privacy is an ever growing concern 
[10] as ubiquitous computers such as smart phones have 
exhibited a wide adoption and an unreserved access to the 
location of a large population may raise practical, legis-
lative and ethical concerns. Both software and hardware 
vendors provide the facilities to seamlessly collect the 
mobile computer’s location. Latest web browser versions 
include the geolocation functionality which provides 
location awareness on web sites leveraging Google’s 
location services. Although upon a user visiting a site for 
the first time he/she will be presented with a list of terms 
and conditions and consent whether his/her location being 
disclosed, the complex structure of Web 2.0 and the inter-
operability of web syndicates will make it very challenging 
to maintain control over who will have access to such 
private information. 
In this paper we focus on a device with a relative 
limited adoption, namely DVB-RCS modem, but our con-
clusions could be generalized and adopted to future en-
hancements of the technology e.g. modems using Regener-
ative Satellites [9]. Location information is vital for 
synchronization purposes in the Return Link of an RCST 
(Return Channel Satellite Terminal) in a DVB-RCS net-
work. Its location (latitude, longitude and altitude), ac-
cording to the standard [7], must be known to the network 
operator with an accuracy of no more than a few kilo-
meters. This requirement prevented the user from provid-
ing dummy coordinates [12] to RCST’s, or use other 
privacy enhancing (e.g. mix-networks [11]) technologies. 
For certain users and sectors (such as government, law en-
forcement and military for example) revealing location 
details can be viewed as an unacceptable leakage of infor-
mation opening the door to other security events e.g. 
a physical attack. 
Despite the RCST location accuracy arguments of the 
DVB-RCS standard, a previous work of the authors [1] 
overcame the standard’s location requirements using 
a methodology based on spatial properties of the com-
ponents (Hub station, satellite, RCST) of a DVB-RCS 
network, whilst not altering the RCST’s internal ranging 
calculations, making cloaking of the RCST location pos-
sible. The main research goal of this work is to propose 
a method for cloaking the location of an RCST, based on 
forcing errors in its internal ranging calculations up to the 
RADIOENGINEERING, VOL. 20, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2011 711 
point accepted by the system. In addition, the proposed 
method was combined with the spatial method presented in 
[1] to produce a “spatial-timing” approach greatly increas-
ing the area that can be used for RCST location cloaking. 
A practical method utilizing this approach, suitable for 
workers on the field, was also developed and tested suc-
cessfully on a real DVB-RCS system. Finally the ex-
perimental results are presented. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we 
develop the proposed privacy preserving “spatial-timing” 
based approach and investigate its integration within the 
DVB-RCS specification. Section 3 describes a proposed 
practical method utilizing the theoretical findings of 
Section 2 along with experimental results on a real DVB-
RCS network, empirically validating the proposed ap-
proach. Finally Section 4 contains the conclusions. 
2. “Spatial-Timing” Based Cloaking 
In the “Spatial-Timing” method we propose for RCST 
location cloaking, the “timing” portion depends on timing 
tolerances, accepted by the DVB-RCS standard, during 
RCST’s login/synchronization procedure. For the benefit 
of the reader, we briefly describe DVB-RCS Return link 
synchronization concepts [6] necessary for understanding 
the proposed method. 
 
Fig. 1. RCST synchronization state diagram. Yellow color 
represent states, blue color represents procedures [6]. 
2.1 Timing Tolerances on DVB-RCS 
Synchronization 
Terminal burst synchronization in DVB-RCS Return 
channel is affected not only by the RCST-to-satellite range; 
there are timing inaccuracies introduced by other factors 
[13]. For example, there is a deviation between the sched-
uled start time of a burst and the actual start time at trans-
mitter output, introduced by the RCST circuitry. DVB-
RCS standard provides compensating mechanisms for 
these timing errors by Coarse, Fine synchronization and 
Maintenance synchronization procedures. Fig. 1 presents in 
a synchronization state diagram the overall event sequenc-
ing in order for the RCST to be able to logon. 
In our study we are interested in the following states 
and accompanying procedures: 
 Off / stand by state, Initial sync procedure. 
 Ready for Coarse sync state, Coarse sync procedure. 
 Ready for Fine sync state, Fine sync procedure, Sync 
Maintenance Procedure.  
In the following we provide a brief description of the 
above states and procedures of Fig. 1 [6] in order to 
identify the timing attributes that will permit us to cloak the 
location of the RCST.  
In the DVB-RCS standard, for an RCST to be able to 
join the network it has to get into various states following 
specific procedures. After boot up (Off/Stand-by state) the 
Terminal starts the Initial synchronization procedure. 
During this procedure RCST receives all necessary control 
information related to the operation of the DVB-RCS 
network through Forward link, including NCR (Network 
Clock Reference) used for initiating RCST’s internal clock. 
Then the RCST performs ranging calculations for both 
Forward and Return link using satellite ephemeris data 
contained in the Satellite Position Table (SPT, acquired 
through Forward link) plus a knowledge of its own 
location (configured by the user). These ranges are then 
used to calculate the corresponding RCST-to-Satellite 
propagation delays. If no errors occur RCST proceeds to 
Receive Sync state. 
The RCST then proceeds to the Logon procedure 
requesting initial access to the network. Initial burst timing 
errors can be low when satellite and terminal positions are 
known. If NCC (Network Control Center) receivers can 
handle these small timing errors there is no need for the 
RCST to perform the ranging process of the Coarse 
Synchronization Procedure, and it enters directly the 
Ready for “Fine Synchronization State”. Otherwise RCST 
performs Coarse Synchronization Procedure. In this pro-
cedure NCC assigns specific time slots for the Terminal to 
transmit its bursts and then measures the corresponding 
timing, frequency and power error relative to the system 
reference. Then the NCC sends this information (Cor-
rection Message Table) back to the RCST through Forward 
link signaling. The RCST then adjusts its transmission 
parameters and retries. This loop is continued until the 
accuracy is within the “coarse synchronization threshold”. 
Fine synchronization procedure is quite similar to the 
Coarse Synchronization Procedure. It is optional and only 
performed if the errors indicated in the latest Correction 
Message Table are larger than the “Fine Synchronization 
Threshold”. 
Finally, after achieving fine synchronization 
procedure, the RCST is allowed to transmit TRF (Traffic) 
bursts. In parallel the RCST maintains synchronization. 
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This procedure is carried out continuously for the duration 
of the session. As we can see, Maintenance synchroniz-
ation procedure watches for timing errors which must be 
within the same limits (fine sync thresholds) as for the fine 
sync procedure. 
2.2 Cloaking through Timing Errors 
As we have shown in the previous paragraphs, all of 
these procedures concerning timing calibration of the 
whole system are a feedback mechanism. Timing errors in 
the arrival of terminal bursts are measured on the NCC and 
timing correction information, through forward channel 
signaling, is sent to the terminals to adjust their burst 
transmission time accordingly. The key point here, regard-
ing our effort to conceal the true location of our RCST, is 
that the NCC identifies a total timing error and cannot 
recognize the source responsible for parts of that error.  
Let us assume that a terminal’s burst during logon 
phase is received from the NCC at time t = t1 when ideally 
should have been received at t = t0. This error Et = t1 - t0 
can be viewed as the sum of the error caused by in-
accuracies in ranging calculations Er plus timing errors 
accounted on other factors Eof (e.g. internal delays of the 
RCST circuitry): 
 .ofErEtE   (1) 
In the case where the initial Et error, measured by the 
NCC (also referred as Hub station), is small (below Fine 
synchronization threshold) there is no need for Coarse and 
Fine Synchronization procedures to be performed and the 
RCST completes the logon procedure. 
We have to note here that if the RCST is configured 
with its true location coordinates and the satellite position 
is maintained in a tight box, initial Er is small. If a big 
initial timing error value (EtBIG) is detected by the Hub 
during logon the Coarse and Fine synchronization 
procedure will attempt to correct the RCST behavior so 
that Et is brought bellow Fine Synchronization Threshold 
(EtFST). 
 .FSTtEtE   (2) 
If the terminal cannot correct its transmission time to 
satisfy (2) it does not synchronize with the Hub. This 
means that the initial measured timing error EtBIG is greater 
than the correcting capabilities of the system EtMAX.  
In the case where initial total timing error Et 
(= Er + Eof) is small, when terminal is configured with its 
true location coordinates, we have the ability to increase Et 
timing error by providing false coordinates to the RCST 
(thus increasing Er), up to the limit (EtMAX) that it cannot 
synchronize with the Hub station. For example let us 
assume that the true distance between an RCST and the 
satellite is DistanceR-S. If we provide the RCST with 
coordinates (LatR’, LongR’, AltR’) of a location R’ that 
produce a false DistanceR’-S to the satellite, we force an 
initial timing error of: 
  
of
SRSR
rt EC
DistanceDistanceabsEE 

  '''   (3) 
where C is the speed of light. If this initial timing error E’t 
is smaller than EtMAX, the fine synchronization procedure 
can cope with it and we can use the LatR’, LongR’ and 
AltR’ to conceal the true location of our RCST. Of course 
the same timing error is produced by any point R’’ on 
Earth’s surface that has LatR’’, LongR’’ and AltR’’ 
coordinates, satisfying the following equation: 
 .''' SRDistanceSRDistance   (4) 
Due to spatial properties of the system the geometric 
place of LatR’’, LongR’’ and AltR’’ that satisfies (4) is 
a circle on Earth’s surface like the one depicted in Fig. 2, 
resulting in this combined “spatial-timing” approach for 
concealing our terminal true location. 
 
Fig. 2. The combined “spatial-timing” approach. The two red 
circles on Earth’s surface, at distances D1 and D2 from 
satellite S, produce the maximum timing error Fine 
Synchronization procedure can handle, when terminal 
located at red X mark is configured with false co-
ordinates lying on these circles. In theory, any lo-
cation’s coordinates on Earth’s surface between these 
red circles (RCST Synchronization Zone) can be used 
to successfully synchronize the RCST with the Hub 
Station (of course in reality they must also lie inside 
satellite’s footprint). 
From (3) it is clear that the initial timing error E’t 
increases when the absolute value of the difference 
between the true distance from the satellite (DistanceR-S) 
and the false one (DistanceR’-S) increases too. We can 
increase this difference, by increasing or decreasing 
DistanceR’-S, up to the point that the resulting initial error 
EtMAX cannot be compensated by the Fine Synchronization 
Procedure. This is depicted in Fig. 2 and expressed math-
ematically with the following equation : 
 2)(1 ,',',' DDistanceD AltSAltRLongRLatRSR'     (5) 
where LatR’, LongR’, AltR’ represent locations on Earth’s 
surface. The geometric place of places satisfying (5) is the 
ribbon on Earth’s surface called “RCST Synchronization 
Zone” (Depicted in Fig. 2). 
RADIOENGINEERING, VOL. 20, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2011 713 
2.3 Location Privacy Improvement Metric 
A simple metric, called LPI, was devised in [1] in 
order to quantify the improvement in location privacy that 
the “spatial” cloaking method offered to an RCST. LPI is 
practically the ratio of the area AIF that is available for 
cloaking the RCST’s coordinates, to the minimum area At 
that DVB-RCS standard [7] requires an RCST to reside 
within. Since the “spatial-timing” method increases AIF 
compared to the plain “spatial” method we can use the 
same metric.  
 .
t
IF
I A
ALP   (6) 
The area At, as defined in [1] according to require-
ments stated in [7], is the area of a circle with center the 
true location of the RCST and a radius of 2 km: 
 .km 56.122** 222   rAt  (7) 
The area AIF in “spatial-timing” method is defined as 
the intersection of area ASZ and the servicing satellite 
footprint. ASZ is the result of (5) which produces an “RCST 
Synchronization Zone” depicted in Fig. 2.  
3. Practical Method and Experimental 
Results 
In order to test the theoretical findings presented in 
the previous paragraphs, we developed a practical method, 
suitable for workers in the field and tested it in a real DVB-
RCS network. The proposed method extends the “spatial” 
method presented in [1]. 
For the demonstration of the proposed “spatial-
timing” method, and for comparison reasons to the 
“spatial” experimental results presented in [1], a DVB-RCS 
terminal (SATNET 4100 [15]) was installed at the pre-
mises of Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH). The 
satellite terminal was connected to the DVB-RCS network 
of Hellenic Aerospace Industry which uses the Hellas Sat 2 
satellite. The terminal was initially configured with 
coordinates obtained by a GPS device at the installation 
location. 
Based on Fig. 3 (satellite footprint) and the installa-
tion location of our test terminal (DUTH), we have down-
loaded from ASTER website [2] the freely available DEM 
(Digital Elevation Model) data (WGS84 reference frame 
[5]), in GeoTIFF format [16], for the region which is 
depicted in Fig. 4. Using the DEM data we calculated for 
every point i (having Lati, Longi, Alti coordinates) on the 
terrain the distance (Distancei-S) from Hellas Sat 2 satellite 
located at 39oE. The points whose distance from Hellas Sat 
2 satisfies the following equation: 
 21 DSiDistanceD   (8) 
 
Fig. 3. Footprint of Hellas Sat 2 satellite (adopted from 
LyngSat Maps [14]). 
 
Fig. 4. Digital Elevation Model for the area of interest (lies 
inside Hellas Sat 2 footprint). Color represents the 
altitude above sea level. 
can be considered to pass the fine synchronization 
procedure (their timing errors can be compensated by the 
DVB-RCS system) and that their latitude, longitude and 
altitude (Lati, Longi, Alti) coordinates can be used on the 
RCST instead of the true ones (LatDUTH, LongDUTH, 
AltDUTH). 
Since D1 and D2 depend on the tolerances of the 
DVB-RCS network (Fine Synchronization Threshold), 
which are not announced to the user, we devised for their 
calculation the following empirical procedure. We provide 
the RCST with false coordinates that lie on the direction of 
the Azimuth to the satellite at the installation location, 
moving towards and away from the satellite. This 
procedure continues until the RCST cannot synchronize 
with the Hub station. We choose to test coordinates that lie 
on the previously described direction, since this is the 
fastest way to increase the errors in RCST ranging 
calculations. 
This procedure produces two “outer” points, which 
define the limits on the timing errors that the Hub can 
tolerate. For the RCST located at DUTH premises the 
results of this procedure are depicted in Fig. 5 and 
presented in Tab. 1. From Fig. 5 we use the coordinates of 
Points P3N and P4S in order to find the Distances D1 and 
D2 of (8). P3N and P4S are the last coordinates that our 
modem synchronized to the hub moving away and towards 
the satellite respectively. 
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Fig. 5. Yellow marker represents the true location of the 
RCST (DUTH premises). Green markers represent the 
coordinates that when inserted to the RCST, the syn-
chronization to the Hub was maintained. Red markers 
represent the locations that when inserted to the RCST, 
synchronization to Hub was not possible. 
 
Fig. 6. In the gray area lie the points that satisfy (8) for 
D1 = 37721387.41 m and D2 = 37780244.51 m. This 
means that if we configure the RCST with coordinates 
that lie in the gray zone the RCST will synchronize 
with the Hub station. 
 
Test 
Point 
Lat(o) Long(o) Alt(m) Dist. From 
Satellite 
(m)  
RCST 
Sync. 
(YES/NO) 
P1S 41.028519 24.969171 22 37738148 YES 
P2S 40.973225 25.018415 14 37732669 YES 
P3S 40.890607 25.070411 0 37724983 YES 
P4S 40.855478 25.107001 0 37721387 YES 
P5S 40.834664 25.127264 0 37719289 NO 
      
P1N 41.265897 24.811874 890 37759958 YES 
P2N 41.408245 24.740939 1011 37772804 YES 
P3N 41.495369 24.715894 1105 37780244 YES 
P4N 41.549274 24.712915 1041 37784643 NO 
Tab. 1. Coordinates of Test Points (latitude, longitude, 
altitude). Timing errors in ranging calculation are 
caused by configuring RCST with fake coordinates. 
 
 
Fig. 7. The yellow X marker represents the true location of the 
RCST. Markers denoted as PiUL and PiDL represent 
points with coordinates that lie inside the “grey” zone 
of Fig 6. Markers denoted as PiUU and PiDU represent 
points with coordinates outside the “grey” zone of 
Fig. 6. A green marker indicates that the RCST located 
at X synchronized with Hub when configured with 
markers coordinates. A red marker indicates that the 
RCST could not synchronize with the Hub when 
configured with markers coordinates. 
 
Distances D1 and D2 are derived from Tab. 1 and are: 
 m,  41.377213871D    
 m.  51.377802442 D    
Substituting D1 and D2 in (8) the resulting cloaking 
area for the Digital elevation map of Fig. 4 is presented in 
Fig. 6. 
Unfortunately we cannot test for every point that lies 
in the gray zone of Fig. 6. Configuring the RCST with 
coordinates and waiting for it to synchronize with the hub 
station is a procedure that usually takes about 4 minutes.  
 
In order to test our theory we have chosen a number 
of points that lie inside the gray zone and a number of 
points that lie outside the gray zone. Results are depicted in 
Fig. 7. Points inside the gray zone are named PiUL and 
PiDL and are chosen to be near the edges of the gray zone 
of Fig. 6. Points outside the gray zone are named PiUU and 
PiDU. If the modem synchronized, when configured with 
the coordinates of a point, the marker of the point was 
painted green, else it was painted red. As we can see from 
Fig. 7 the experimental results verify our calculations.  
We now have to see how these results improve the 
location privacy of our RCST. In the case of the terminal 
located at DUTH the gray zone of Fig. 6, excluding the sea 
areas is 
 .km 43200 2IFA  (9) 
Location privacy was improved by a factor of ~3439 
times: 
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 .3439
km 56.12
km 43200
2
2

t
IF
I A
ALP  (10) 
If we compare the above LPI result, produced by the 
“spatial-timing” method for the DUTH experiment, to the 
corresponding “spatial” method produced LPI (~131) of 
[1], we find that the “spatial-timing” method increased the 
LPI by a factor of 26 for the specific experiment setup. 
The same test procedure was repeated successfully for 
a terminal located at: 
 
m. 28
,690662.23
,962939.37
2
2
2



TEST
o
TEST
o
TEST
Alt
Long
Lat
 (11) 
The cloaking “grey” zone for this location along with 
experimental results for finding the width of the zone along 
verification experiment are presented in Fig. 8 and 9 
respectively. 
4. Conclusions and Areas of Further 
Research 
In this work we presented that spatial attributes and 
timing tolerances of the DVB-RCS return link 
synchronization design can be exploited in combination 
and improve significantly the location privacy of an RCST. 
A practical methodology for this “spatial-timing” approach 
was also presented for the calculation of the area inside the 
satellite’s footprint where the user can effectively and 
systematically “hide” his terminal. The theoretical findings 
and the proposed methodology were successfully tested on 
a real DVB-RCS system. Although location privacy was 
greatly improved, and the RCST synchronized successfully 
with the Hub station, we have not tested the relation 
between the introduced timing errors and the degradation 
of QOS if any. It is our intent to explore, in a following 
work, this relation in order to find if there is any side 
channel information that can be used to reveal the true 
location of the RCST. 
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